Rochester, MN · Security Engineering & Operations · Rev 2026.09

Rasheed Farhat

Security engineering, tested and bounded.

Detection engineering, security operations, and assurance work built around careful investigation, tested automation, and clear documentation.

Prefer to inspect the code? Browse source on GitHub (opens in a new tab)

  • Open to junior roles
  • Security+ / CySA+ / CSAP
Portrait of Rasheed Farhat
R. Farhat

DaC-Pipeline / rule 200001 / T1105

58 Sigma rules in, 216 Wazuh rules out
SOURCE / rules/sigma/sysmon_certutil_download.yml
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\certutil.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'urlcache'
            - 'split'
    condition: selection
Transform
  1. ParsepySigma AST
  2. DistributeDNF, capped at 500
  3. MergePCRE2 lookaheads
  4. RenderJinja2, stable ID
ARTIFACT / build/wazuh/sysmon_certutil_download_200001.xml
<group name="windows, custom_sigma">
  <rule id="200001" level="10">
    <!-- sigma_uuid:c8d8b9e5... -->
    <if_group>sysmon_event1</if_group>
    <field name="win.eventdata.image"
           type="pcre2">
      (?i).*\\certutil\.exe$</field>
    <field name="win.eventdata.commandLine"
           type="pcre2">
      (?=.*(?i).*urlcache.*)(?=.*(?i).*split.*)</field>
    <description>Suspicious Certutil Network
      Connection</description>
    <mitre><id>T1105</id></mitre>
  </rule>
</group>
View full trace (opens in a new tab)

The pipeline parses Sigma logic, preserves stable rule IDs, and validates the generated XML before deployment. Read the full case study.

57 of 58 rules target Windows process creation

Method

What tested and bounded actually costs.

4 rules / applied to every system below

Selected work

Security systems I built.

5 systems / 2025 to 2026

Active open source 2025 to present

Detection-as-Code Pipeline

A from-scratch Sigma-to-Wazuh compiler with validation gates, stable rule identity, and API deployment behind a dry run.

58 Sigma → 216 Wazuh rules
119 ATT&CK techniques, 14 tactics
87 automated tests 57 of 58 rules target Windows process creation

Active open source 2026

Control Plane

An approval-gated environment where identity, endpoint state, ticketing, alerts, approvals, and audit evidence run as one executable chain. Every privileged action passes a recorded policy decision.

2,092-case policy parity
90 of 108 privileged attempts denied
1,631 audit records, chain valid Synthetic environment, not a production platform

Research lab 2026

MCP Security Review Framework

Captures MCP tool-call traffic and turns it into evidence a human reviewer can act on: bounded detections, trust-boundary inventory, and measured blind spots.

10 rules, 5 abuse techniques
4,727-record benign corpus
12 documented evasion classes 3 of 12 evasion classes are structurally undetectable

Lab proof of concept 2026

Deceptive Identity Architecture

An Authentik SSO perimeter wired to Canarytokens and a Python enrichment service, built to study high-signal identity tripwires.

Authentik + Canarytokens
Flask webhook processor
AbuseIPDB enrichment, ARM64 lab Proof of concept, not a production identity control

Active open source 2026

Assertion Desk

A SAML sign-in failure diagnosis pipeline where a deterministic verifier establishes the facts and a grounding gate rejects any model claim the facts do not support.

55 SAML cases, 94.5% disposition accuracy
6 of 6 reachable injection payloads resisted
0 secrets across 280 recorded prompts Keycloak only, and the AI path still trails the deterministic path

Writing

Technical investigations.

3-part series / 2026

Contact

Let’s talk security operations.

I'm seeking junior security operations, detection automation, assurance, and IT roles. I am also open to scoped project conversations that need careful testing and documentation.